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Kant‟s theory of taste suggests the possibility of community with others who share our 
sensibilities and capacities to judge the beauty of nature and art. This community is, however, 
not based on common concepts, arguments, meanings, opinions or convictions, nor on 
dialogue, contingent social and historical coherence, nor on general moral agreement or 
rational law. By considering the possibility of an aesthetic common sense (sensus communis 
aestheticus), which is fundamentally enmeshed in human sensibility and affect, Kant 
introduces the idea of an affective „sensus communalis‟, which not only aims to justify the 
universal communicability (Mitteilbarkeit) of aesthetic judgements, but also ultimately joins 
together the most personal contingent feelings of pleasure (or displeasure) with a necessary, 
universal and cosmopolitan idea of humanity, which is based on the shareability of affects.
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This transcendental idea has to be presupposed, or so Kant argues, in order to legitimate the 
communicability of aesthetic pleasure and promote human sensibility and affect in 
communion with others (CJ, 5:297; 5:433; 5:355). 
 
 
1. Universal Communicability 
 
The problem of founding the aesthetic judgment‟s universal validity claim can only be tackled 
by introducing an important term that Kant uses for the first time in the notorious § 9 (on the 
question whether in a judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the 
object or the judging precedes the pleasure), viz. universal communicability (allgemeine 
Mittheilbarkeit). This is what needs to be accounted for if we want to find the justification for 
the universality claim in the judgment of taste. Unfortunately, Kant has written one of the 
most confusing passages on this very issue. He states: 
 
If the pleasure in the given object came first, and our judgment of taste were to 
attribute only the pleasure‟s universal communicability to the presentation of the 
object, then this procedure would be self-contradictory. For that kind of pleasure 
would be none other than mere agreeableness in the sensation, so that by its very 
nature it could have only private validity, because it would depend directly on the 
presentation by which the object is given. Hence it must be the capacity for being 
universally communicated of the mental state [allgemeine Mittheilungsfähigkeit 
des Gemüthszustandes], in the given representation, which underlies the judgment 
of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its 
consequence. (CJ, 5:217)  
 
Kant makes two rather puzzling statements. First, the pleasure is said to be the result of the 
aesthetic judgment; but how is this possible if the pleasure is also supposed to be the 
judgment‟s condition or ground? Secondly, aesthetic pleasure is argued to be the consequence 
of the universal communicability of the mental state in the judgment. How can the pleasure of 
taste be the consequence of the universal communicability of the mental state, when the latter 
is supposed to be pleasurable itself (at least in positive judgments of taste)? This looks really 
circular.
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 But, in fact, Kant can be defended by making an essential distinction between the 
act of judging or contemplating the object (Beurtheilung des Gegenstandes) and the judgment 
of taste (Geschmacksurtheil) as such. Judging the object obviously precedes the pleasure, but 
the latter precedes the actual judgment of taste. It not only precedes it, it also forms the 
determining ground of the judgment of taste proper. According to Paul Guyer
3
, § 9 contains 
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the basic elements for a theory of aesthetic appraisal that consists of two logically – but not 
necessarily phenomenologically – distinct acts of reflection. First, an act of mere reflection in 
which pleasure is felt, and secondly, an act of aesthetic judgment proper, in which the 
pleasure is attributed to the harmonious play of the faculties. On this reading too, however, 
Kant‟s apparent implication that the universal communicability of the mental state in judging 
the object is itself the source of the sensed pleasure is, as Guyer puts it, „obviously absurd‟,4 
since it suggests that universal communicability is constitutive of aesthetic pleasure instead of 
merely playing a part in evaluating it.
5
  
Yet in the same section Kant explicitly denies that pleasure in the ability to communicate 
one‟s mental state could account for the aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful. There is, Kant 
says, pleasure in the ability to communicate, but one cannot appeal to it to explain the 
transcendental necessity connected with the pure judgment of taste, since this is merely an 
empirical or natural propensity (Hang) to sociability (CJ, 5:218). To explain Kant‟s 
remarkable implication that aesthetic pleasure is grounded in the universal communicability 
we perhaps ought to qualify the aesthetic judgment in the way Hannah Ginsborg does, viz. as 
„a formal and self-referential judgment that claims, not the universal validity of an 
antecedently given feeling of pleasure, but rather its own universal validity with respect to the 
object‟.6 On Ginsborg‟s account, a judgment of taste is a judgment about the normativity of 
one‟s own mental state. The demand for assent is merely the demand that others recognise 
this normativity, i.e., that I judge the object as it ought be judged, namely as beautiful. 
However, one might wonder how self-referential judgments could avoid making use of 
concepts, and hence, whether Ginsborg‟s account does not illegitimately turn aesthetic 
judgments into intellectual judgments, that is, judgments of cognition requiring concepts to 
determine the correctness of ascribing one‟s mental state to others, or – at least – into what 
Kant calls in his Logik Dohna-Wundlacken „beautiful cognition‟ (schöne Erkenntnis), which 
is no longer based on the free play of the cognitive faculties, and is, therefore, altogether 
different form a pure judgment of taste.
7
 Secondly, it is hard to see how Ginsborg‟s view 
could allow for negative judgments of taste: if Kant meant the judgment of taste to be self-
referential, i.e., referring to the normativity or appropriateness of my mental state with regard 
to the object deemed beautiful, and if the pleasure of taste is really in the universal 
communicability of my pleasure, then there is no room for a universally communicable 
displeasure, since, as Allison rightly notes, „universal communicability is itself a source of 
pleasure‟.8  
I do not believe Ginsborg‟s view is what Kant had in mind. It is hard to see how one can 
account for the intricacies of Kant‟s theory of aesthetic response without logically 
distinguishing between two acts of reflection. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to see 
how Guyer‟s logical distinction can be translated into more phenomenological or 
„psychological‟ terms. Phenomenologically speaking, what Kant intimates seems to be the 
following: judging (beurtheilen) the object results in a feeling of pleasure or displeasure in 
me, and this feeling – which is transcendentally grounded in the harmonious play of 
imagination and understanding – signals the universal communicability of it by means of its 
affective purity, i.e., its disinterested nature. Although it forms no legitimate basis for the 
universal validity or communicability of the judgment of taste proper, the disinterestedness is 
actually the affective „symptom‟ of the fact that the pleasure (or displeasure) must be 
attributed to the reciprocal quickening of the mental faculties that are operative in aesthetic 
judgments of taste – the „feeling of life‟9 of the subject – and not to some idiosyncratic 
inclination or quirk: displeasure signals the disharmony, whereas pleasure signals the 
harmony of the two cognitive powers involved in aesthetic judging. It is in this sense that 
Kant‟s statement, quoted above, can be readily understood: „it must be the capacity for being 
universally communicated of the mental state [allgemeine Mittheilungsfähigkeit des 
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Gemüthszustandes], in the given representation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its 
subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence‟ (italics added).  
Instead of qualifying this idea as hopelessly absurd, as Paul Guyer does, or (like Hannah 
Ginsborg) defining aesthetic judgments as self-referential which deprives them of their 
disinterested nature – since pleasure in the universal communicability of the mental state 
cannot be disinterested but is (as Kant holds) a natural inclination – or, as Henry Allison10 
does, trying to solve the problems in the quoted passage by changing the words, as if Kant had 
committed a slip of the pen, one might perhaps interpret Kant‟s words in § 9 – no matter how 
clumsy Kant‟s formulation is – as follows. Phenomenologically speaking, the purity of taste – 
the disinterestedness of the experienced pleasure – is subjectively determined (as its 
subjective condition, Kant says) by the necessity of being universally communicable or 
shareable, i.e., by the „signal‟ in the mind (Gemüth) that the felt pleasure (or displeasure) is 
universally communicable. Thus, the universal communicability of the mental state is the 
affective sign of the purity of the felt pleasure or displeasure. This implies that, on the one 
hand, the disinterestedness of the pleasure is the essential, a priori condition for the universal 
communicability of aesthetic judgments – without disinterestedness aesthetic judgments could 
not be universally shared. But, on the other hand, the capacity for universal communicability 
is itself the ideal gauge to estimate whether the experienced pleasure is really disinterested or 
not. Hence, Kant writes: „the pleasure in the object must be its consequence‟, which means 
that only in and through its possible universal communication can it be estimated whether or 
not the felt pleasure is actually disinterested or not. So in this sense, and in this sense only, 
can the pleasure in an object be the consequence of „the capacity for being universally 
communicated of the mental state‟. Whether or not the pleasure is really pure pleasure, i.e., 
the disinterested pleasure that grounds a pure judgment of taste, depends on the very universal 
communicability of the aesthetic judgment, which is the ratio cognoscendi of the 
disinterestedness of the pleasure. That one can actually be fairly certain (though one will 
never be able to prove it by means of arguments) that the pleasure one experiences here and 
now is disinterested is grounded in – though not caused by – the universal communicability of 
the mental state, or more precisely, in the affect that „signals‟ whether or not the activity of 
the mental powers is universally communicable. And this affect, or rather this universally 
communicable mental state, of course, presupposes „a capacity for being universally 
communicated‟.  
 
 
2. Aesthetic Common Sense 
 
Since judgments of taste are not cognitive judgments, they cannot be based on a determinate 
objective principle, and hence they are not unconditionally necessary. On the other hand, if 
they had no normative force, „if they had no principle at all […], then the thought that they 
have a necessity would not occur to us at all‟ (CJ, 5:238). This (subjective) principle is called 
„common sense‟ (Gemeinsinn) in § 20. Kant stresses that this aesthetic Gemeinsinn must be 
clearly distinguished from the common understanding (der gemeine Verstand), for the latter 
judges according to concepts and not according to feeling. There is a crucial difference 
between the „sensus communis logicus‟ (mentioned in § 40) and the „sensus communis 
aestheticus‟.11 
 
The aesthetic common sense he is talking about in the context of judgments of taste is first 
and foremost a sense, so a question of sensibility and feeling: „a sense (or feeling) for what is 
universally communicable, which can also be assumed to be universally shared. Otherwise 
expressed, it is a shared capacity to feel what may be universally shareable.‟12  This notion of 
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common sense, although introduced rather abruptly in § 20, has a long history in Kant‟s own 
views on the communal nature of taste, as is clear from the following passage in the Lectures 
on Metaphysics:    
 
But how can a human being pass a judgment according to the universal sense, 
since he still considers the object according to his private sense? The community 
among human beings constitutes a communal sense. Out of the intercourse among 
human beings a communal sense arises which is valid for everyone. Thus whoever 
does not come into a community has no communal sense. – The beautiful and the 
ugly can be distinguished by human beings only so far as they are in a 
community. Thus whomever something pleases according to a communal and 
universally valid sense, he has taste. Taste is therefore a faculty for judging 
through satisfaction or dissatisfaction, according to the communal and universally 
valid sense. But taste is still always only a judging through the relation of the 
senses, and on that account this faculty is a faculty of pleasure and displeasure. 
Objective satisfaction or dissatisfaction, or judging objects according to 
universally valid grounds of the power of cognition, is the higher faculty of 
pleasure and displeasure. This is the faculty for judging of an object whether it 
pleases or displeases from cognition of the understanding according to universally 
valid principles. If something is an object of intellectual satisfaction, then it is 
good; if it is an object of intellectual dissatisfaction, then it is evil. – Good is what 
must please everyone necessarily. – But the beautiful does not please everyone 
necessarily, rather the agreement of the judgment is contingent. (LM 28: 249)
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This is a very interesting fragment for several reasons. Kant had clearly not developed his 
complex idea of the „exemplary necessity‟ of pure judgments of taste, i.e. the necessary 
requirement of such judgments‟ universal assent, which is not based on concepts (CJ, 
5:237). But it is equally clear that in his Lectures on Metaphysics, as in his Anthropology, 
the idea of the close relationship between the capacity of taste and being-in-community is 
already overly present, and that Kant had already developed the thought of an affinity 
between the notions „sensus communis‟ and „sensus communalis‟ before writing the 
Critique of Judgment. In the Critique of Judgment, however, Kant develops the idea of a 
„sensus communis‟ within a transcendental framework, which explains why Kant cannot 
ground the universal shareability of judgments of taste in the human inclination to 
sociability (Geselligkeit). On the other hand, it also warns against too strict a separation of 
those approaches: Kant would never have come up with the idea of a sensus communis, if 
he had not been convinced of the anthropological existence and relevance of togetherness 
and being-in-community: hence he says that „the beautiful and the ugly can be 
distinguished by human beings only so far as they are in a community‟; an idea that 
Hannah Arendt
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 will develop in her famous political reading of Kant‟s third Critique. 
Moreover, Kant was well aware of the pleasure of being with others and of the interest of 
sociability. The whole idea of universal communicability (Mitteilbarkeit) follows from this 
intuition: the peculiar knowledge that what I feel could be and ought to be shared by other 
people is itself a source of pleasure.
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 But we are ready now to follow the argument that 
Kant develops in § 21. 
 
The argument presented in section 21 can be divided into seven different steps
16
: 
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1. Cognitions and judgments, together with their accompanying convictions 
[propositional attitudes] must be universally communicable. This is a condition of 
claiming agreement with an object; consequently, its denial leads to skepticism. 
2. This entails that the mental state required for cognition in general, that is, the 
„attunement‟ [Stimmung] of the cognitive faculties, which is that „proportion‟ 
[Proportion] suitable for turning representations into cognitions, must also be 
universally communicable. Again, to deny this would be to open the door for 
skepticism, since this attunement is the subjective cognition of cognition. 
3. This attunement actually occurs whenever the perception of a given object puts the 
imagination into play, which, in turn, sets the understanding into action; but this 
attunement varies in proportion to differences in the occasioning objects. 
4. Nevertheless, there must be one optimal attunement, that is, one in which the inner 
relation is most conducive to the mutual quickening of the cognitive faculties with a 
view to cognition in general; and this attunement can be determined (recognised) only 
by feeling (since the alternative – concepts – is ruled out). 
5. Moreover, both this attunement and the feeling of it in connection with a given 
representation must likewise be universally communicable. 
6. But the universal communicability of this feeling presupposes a common sense. 
7. Consequently, we do have a basis for assuming a common sense, without relying on 
psychological observation, as a necessary condition of the universal communicability 
of our cognition, which must itself be presupposed if skepticism is to be avoided. 
 
A lot could be said (and has been said) about this argument, especially if we read it as an 
attempt to provide a deduction of common sense as a condition of taste, but I just want to 
focus on one element that is crucial if we want to develop Kant‟s idea of a common sense in a 
more pragmatic (and hence less speculative) way. It is important to note that Kant here claims 
merely to have shown that there are grounds for assuming a common sense, not that he has 
proved the existence of a common sense. He fully realised that he needed much more 
argumentation to provide a proper demonstration for that. One problem with his account in § 
21 is that it seems to suggest a solution that he wanted to avoid, viz. that the aesthetic 
common sense must be presupposed as a condition of cognition in general. This Humean 
solution is surprising, since it is hard to grasp how a common sense that was defined in § 21 
as the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive capacities, could serve as condition of 
cognition. This is, as Allison argues, clearly incoherent.
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 There is only one way of avoiding 
this incoherent reasoning, and that is by assuming that in § 21 Kant uses the term „common 
sense‟ not to refer to the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers, not to taste as such, 
but rather (as Allison rightly holds) to the capacity „for immediately seeing (without appeal to 
rules, and therefore through “feeling”) whether, and how fully, a given intuited manifold 
accords with a particular concept, that is, judgment‟18. By analogy, it can then be argued that 
there are epistemic, nonpsychological grounds to assume that in taste too there must be a 
sensus communis aestheticus, i.e., one must first assume that there is „a peculiar talent‟ to 
recognize a fit between understanding and imagination in cognition, otherwise the assumption 
of the capacity to do so when the cognitive powers are in free play (as is the case in taste) is at 
least highly implausible. Kant clearly hasn‟t sufficiently demonstrated that we do have a basis 
for assuming or postulating an aesthetic common sense, but indirectly he has provided 
arguments for its plausibility, i.e.,  by showing that „the attunement itself, and hence also the 
feeling of it, must be universally communicable‟ (CJ, 5:239; 88; 158), unless we plainly 
endorse skepticism which Kant, of course, does not. The question now arises as to whether 
the link with morality might provide a better ground for the aesthetic judgment‟s claim to 
universal assent. 
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3. Aesthetic and moral normativitiy 
 
In § 22 Kant argues that aesthetic judgments contain an „ought‟: using common sense in 
matters of taste implies not that everybody will agree with my judgment but ought to; 
therefore, the demand for agreement in judgments of taste is comparable to similar moral or 
cognitive claims. Donald Crawford
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, Ray K. Elliott
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, and many others have argued that the 
demand of a judgment of taste for universal agreement is a moral claim, but although Kant 
clearly argues that there is a moral interest in beauty (and especially in natural beauty), the 
requirement that judgments of taste be universally shared is not of a moral but an 
epistemological kind. Paul Guyer sums up the considerations that support this interpretation. 
First, Kant bases the second moment on the first, viz. the qualitative characterization of the 
judgment as devoid of any interest. It is quite unlikely, however, that a moral demand could 
be based on a requirement of disinterestedness, which is meant to separate the aesthetic 
judgment from any connection with an interest to morality. Secondly, in §§ 8-9 Kant is clearly 
concerned with epistemological grounds for a title to universality, and all moral grounds are 
excluded. Thirdly, Kant uses cognitive instead of moral terminology to describe the claim to 
universal shareability: „it must be seen as based on what he can presuppose in everyone else 
as well‟, and aesthetic judgment is said to be similar to logical judgment „inasmuch as we may 
presuppose it to be valid for everyone‟ (CJ, § 6, 211; 212; italics added).21 The claim to 
universal validity is not a moral demand but implies that the ground may be presupposed in 
others as well; aesthetic judgment „presupposes‟ the feeling of pleasure in others, or attributes 
it to them.
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 This is what Kant‟s phrase „speaking with a universal voice‟ (CJ, 5:216) means: 
it is „imputing feelings of pleasure to others on the basis of one‟s own feeling‟23.  
Kant insists that the crucial difference between aesthetic (reflective) and moral (intellectual) 
judgments is that the latter entail not merely a claim (Anspruch) but also a command (Gebot) 
to universal assent:  
 
The absolutely good (the object of moral feeling), as judged subjectively by the 
feeling it inspires, is the ability of the subject‟s powers to be determined by the 
conception of a law that obligates absolutely. It is distinguished above all by its 
modality: a necessity that rests on a priori concepts and contains not just a claim 
but also a command that everyone approve. Actually, the absolutely good belongs 
not to aesthetic but to pure intellectual judgment; by the same token, we attribute 
it to freedom rather than to nature, and in a determinative rather than in a merely 
reflective judgment. (CJ, 5:267) 
 
The aesthetic common sense is a mere ideal standard and is, in this respect at least, analogous 
to the categorical imperative. Contrary to the latter, however, the sensus communis does not 
provide determinate criteria: „there is no universalizability test, or analogue thereof, for 
taste‟.24 Why is the sensus communis now called an ideal standard or norm (bloss idealische 
Norm), instead of, as was previously the case, a sense or feeling? The reason is simply 
because it underwrites the claim to speak with a universal voice (as Kant stated in § 9). As 
Allison argues, „it is only because the idea of a common sense serves as an ideal norm that the 
demand for universal agreement associated with the aesthetic discrimination of taste is even 
conceivable.‟25 However, after repeating that our presumption in making judgments of taste 
proves that „we do actually presuppose this indeterminate standard of a common sense‟, quite 
suddenly and surprisingly in light of the preceding paragraphs, Kant asks:  
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But is there in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of the 
possibility of experience, or is there a still higher principle of reason that makes it 
only a regulative principle for us, [in order] to bring forth in us, for higher 
purposes, a common sense in the first place? In other words, is taste an original 
and natural ability, or is taste only the idea of an ability yet to be acquired and 
[therefore] artificial, so that judgment of taste with its requirement for universal 
assent [mit seiner Zumutung einer allgemeinen Beistimmung] is in fact only a 
demand of reason to produce such agreement in the way we sense [eine solche 
Einhelligkeit der Sinnesart]? In the latter case the ought, i.e., the objective 
necessity that everyone‟s feeling flow along with the particular feeling of each 
person, would signify only that there is a possibility of reaching such agreement; 
and the judgment of taste would only offer an example of the application of this 
principle. These questions we neither wish to nor can investigate at this point. For 
the present our task is only to analyze the power of taste into its elements, and to 
unite these ultimately in the idea of a common sense. (CJ, 5:240) 
 
Whereas Kant seemed convinced that the sensus communis was a constitutive principle, here 
he seems to change his mind, or at least hesitate, since he considers the possibility of the 
sensus communis as a merely regulative principle and taste a not-yet-acquired capacity, which 
is surprising if we consider the previous paragraphs as attempts to deduce judgments of taste.  
These questions are perhaps less puzzling when considered as ultimately referring to the 
relationship between taste and morality. In Kant‟s view there is a clear connection between 
taste and morality. There are even several commentators, e.g. Anthony Savile
26
, that argue 
that the demand of judgments of taste to be universally shared is in one way or another 
grounded in the „ought‟ of morality – which is what Kant seems to suggest in the previously 
quoted passage. Nevertheless, we must distinguish two different „oughts‟ in taste: first, the 
demand for universal assent. As Allison says, „it is this ought that presupposes common 
sense, and it is quite independent of morality.‟27 The second ought is the demand to acquire 
and develop the capacity of taste itself, and this demand or requirement is connected with 
morality. But, pace Savile, it does not follow that the first „ought‟ is based on the second. 
Naturally, it would be absurd to demand universal assent to a judgment of taste, unless I 
presupposed that there are others with a similar ability to discriminate between beauty and 
mere charm or agreeableness. But from this it does not follow that the requirement to develop 
and refine these discriminatory abilities grounds the aesthetic „ought‟, i.e., the demand for 
universal shareability of judgments of taste. On the contrary, and here I am again in 
agreement with Allison, the moral demand to develop the capacity of taste presupposes the 
universalisability claim of the pure judgment of taste: it is only because there is an inherent 
normative claim in judgments of taste that it could be morally interesting to develop the 
capacity to make such judgments.
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This caveat is important, especially because Kant has made many commentators believe that 
the transition (Übergang) from beauty to morality is equivalent to saying that taste is 
inherently moral or that the capacity of taste is a necessary condition to a good will. Nothing 
of this is actually faithful to Kant‟s enterprise, though. On the contrary, he clearly insists on 
the universalisability of taste, and even claims – against any humanistic interpretation of the 
sensus communis – that taste is more entitled to being called „common sense‟ than is the 
„common human understanding‟, which reduces the idea of communality to vulgarity, the 
possession of which involves no merit whatsoever (CJ, 5:294). Instead, Kant makes clear that 
he is talking of common sense to refer to „the idea of a public sense [gemeinschaftlichen 
Sinnes]‟, i.e., „a power to judge that in reflecting takes into account (a priori) […] everyone 
else‟s way of presenting [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment […] 
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not so much with the actual as rather with the merely possible judgments of others, and [thus] 
put ourselves in the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that 
may happen to attach our own judging‟ (CJ, 5:293-294).  
Although there are clear analogies here with moral reflection, Kant does not claim that 
abstracting from the limitations of our aesthetic judging, i.e., by paying attention solely to the 
formal features of our representation or our representational state‟ is a necessary or sufficient 
condition for morality. The latter would lead to aestheticism, which is obviously not what 
Kant wants to defend here. On the contrary, taste and morality are both autonomous, and it is 
only because taste lays claim to universal assent that it may symbolize morality. The adoption 
of a general perspective – a perspective in which other people‟s judgments are democratically 
taken into account – is crucial in this sense: in virtue of this capacity to adopt a broadened 
point of view, as it were, aesthetic reflection, which brings along „a certain ennoblement‟, 
may serve as a symbol for morality. As Henry Allison writes, „just as the beautiful does not 
effect a transition from the sensible to the supersensible because it symbolizes morality, but 
rather symbolizes morality because it effects such a transition, so, too, the pure judgment of 
taste does not make a valid demand on others because it symbolizes morality, but rather it is 
because of the “purity” underlying the validity of its demand that it symbolises morality.‟29   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In aesthetic judging we not only experience ourselves as free from the push and pull of our 
drives, needs and desires but also experience the „liberality‟ of our active engagement with an 
object and an enlivenment and expansion of our cognitive capacities (CJ, 5:268). This 
experience of „aesthetic freedom‟ – which is grounded in the freedom of the imagination in 
aesthetic judging – is no merely private or personal matter. It is, Kant rightly holds, 
inextricably connected with the feeling of being-together with others, with whom we share 
similar capacities to judge the beauties of nature and art. In this sense, beauty presupposes not 
only a shared aesthetic sensibility but also a subject that is not primarily concerned with its 
own personal and private sensations but is always – at least in principle – aware of the 
shareability of its aesthetic affects and the communality of its aesthetic appraisal. In aesthetic 
judging, we do not merely feel our „elevation‟ above mere sense pleasure but also experience, 
as it were, a common affective bond with a cosmopolitan community in which all human 
beings participate and through which they „esteem the value of others‟ (5:353).  Aesthetic 
judging is, therefore, not of signal importance because it would make a transition from the 
sensible to the supersensible, but because it offers a way of rethinking subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity as manifest within felt, particularised pleasures that are universally shareable 
– not despite but due to their affective nature (CJ, 5:353; 355).30  
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